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ABSTRACT - The principle of Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) as a GATT rule as annexed to World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) is viewed as very crucial in the 
operations of the WTO amongst member countries.   
Another rule of striking importance is the standard of 
non-discrimination inserted in the MFN rules. As against 
the background, this study addresses the routine 
conviction with respect to the viability of GATT laws and 
WTO rules in the light of non-discrimination principle 
and Multifibre Agreement (MFA) and, The National 
Treatment Principle. The study explores the standards of 
these rules which are whittled down with concrete 
exemption clauses. These clauses make the adequacy of 
unhindered commerce guideline perplexed amongst 
member nations especially, the Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
study finds that rules of GATT having been made since 
1947 at the time when Africa‟s economic development was 
annexed to their colonial masters and therefore, not in 
contemplation by the progenitors. The realization that 
Africa ought to be given chance to develop come too late 
within the GATT rules. The study finds that the current 
GATT structure cannot advance the promotion of African 
trade. The study addresses the grouping of African 
nations with other nations like Asia, India and South 
America as a misnomer and erroneous as Africa is the 
least developed in terms of international trade bargaining 
power among other developing countries. The study after 
analyzing MFN, MFA, National Treatment principle and 
Transparency rules of GATT, concludes they are 
development deficit as against trade promotion. The study 
further concludes that the difficulties in finding an 
acceptable definition of the „like product‟ by several 
Dispute Resolution Panels as laid down by GATT makes 
nonsense of the rule and a lacuna in the definition of 
Article III (2) and III (4) as they are components of 
paralysis of non-clarifications.  
Index Terms-  Most Favoured Nations, General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Multifibre Agreement, 
World Trade Organisation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last twenty years, there has been in existence, 
an interesting division between from one perspective; a 
quick creation of laws which ought to regulates 
commercial operations. On the other hand is the 
obvious unimportance of fast production of laws 
regulating international business operations which 
sometimes sidelined the concerns of some 
stakeholders?1  Most interestingly, these stakeholders 
later became bound by such laws.2 In keeping with the 
objective of Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) to figure out which nation is 
economically poor and which nation is not in financial 
advancement, a report is produced every year by 
OECD to monitor the economic development of 
countries all over the world. Development Assistance 
Committee, an arm of OECD is responsible for 
generating the annual report to determine economic 
outcome of developing countries. 
The discussion which led to the establishment of 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was 
immediately after the WWII. The discussion 
crystallized between the periods of 1946 – 1948. When 
WTO was established on January 1, 1995, it was to 
become the principal organization for rules governing 
the present international trade. The WTO is the most 
paramount international organization that governs the 
world trade. It has over 150 members and some 
observer regimes (most of which have applied for 
membership), and members represent over 95% of 
World trade.3 After the annual report, the World Bank 
and OECD make recommendations alerting the world 
of the poorest nations. The report of the OECD is very 
relevant to donor agencies in deciding which country 
ought to get economic aid and the specific amount of 
financial assistance to be given. When African 
countries were depending on aid, the report also shapes 
the donors‟ policy decision towards development in 
deciding which country gets more attention for 
economic development.  
II. GATT AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
 The negotiations which established GATT resulted 
through the effort of Americans and British. Some 
views were exchanged in Washington between 
September and October 1943. In that meeting, certain 
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agreements on issues of substantive concern were 
reached and these were formed into policies. The 
leading problem at the period includes trade 
restriction, subsidies, export taxes, state trading, 
discrimination, and basically, tariff reduction on trade.  
Africa and most of the LDCs had no input in the 
formation of GATT and hence the affairs of WTO.  
Other issues such as quantitative restrictions 
commonly known as quotas were to be prohibited. 
The only agreed exception was the quotas used to deal 
with balance of payments emergencies. Export taxes 
and export subsidies were to be eliminated. State 
trading enterprises were to be encouraged to behave 
like private traders. Discrimination had to be 
outlawed, and tariffs had to be reduced substantially.  
The proposals were accepted by the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council in early 1946 
and a "United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment" was officially convened.  A Preparatory 
Committee, consisting of eighteen key governments, 
was appointed to prepare a draft charter for 
consideration by the Plenary Conference. Africa was 
not represented at the time.  At the end of the first 
session of the Preparatory Committee, held in London, 
the United States extended a formal invitation to the 
other seventy members of the Committee to meet to 
negotiate a concrete arrangement for the relaxation of 
tariff and trade barriers of all types.4 The tariff 
negotiations started in April 1947 and on October 30th 
of that year, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) was signed by "contracting parties" of 
twenty-three countries.5  Out of these twenty-three 
countries, no states from Africa was invited to 
participate, at least, it is not on record as at the time of 
this study.6  This may account for why African states 
have been criticized for showing low profile in 
international trade negotiations.7 The participation of 
Africa in GATT is only a handful country that showed 
some interest. However, presently in GATT 
membership, African states constitute some important 
                                                           
4The first Session was held in 1947 and the members of the 
Preparatory Committee had two major assignments before them, to 
work out a draft charter for consideration and decision by the Havana 
Conference. They are also to organize the tariff negotiations and 
revise the Draft Agreement on Tariffs in Trade in existence. 
    21. With the exception of eight countries (Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom 
and the United States), the Agreement went into effect on January 1, 
1948. In the following months, the remaining countries ratified the 
Agreement. At the same time, signatory countries were drawing up 
the "Havana Charter" for the proposed ITO.  
6 In an effort to give an early boost to trade liberalization after the 
Second World War - and to begin to correct the large overhang of 
protectionist measures which remained in place from the early 1930s 
- tariff negotiations were opened among the 23 founding GATT 
"contracting parties" in 1946. This first round of negotiations resulted 
in 45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion - or about one-fifth - 
of world trade. It was also agreed that the value of these concessions 
should be protected by early - and largely "provisional" - acceptance 
of some of the trade rules in the draft ITO Charter. The tariff 
concessions and rules together became known as the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and entered into force in January 
1948. 
7 W. Benedek, “The Participation of Africa in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)” (1987)  Verfassung und Recht in 
Übersee / Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, Vol. 
20, No. 1 pp. 45-58 , Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH . Accessed on 
the 22nd day of  July, 2016 at  www.jstor.org/stable/43109626. 
group with 28 out of 91 full members, 12 more de-facto 
members8 and one provisional member.9 It is to be 
noted that only 12 African countries are represented 
among the 69 members of the GATT Council, the main 
organ of GATT. Only 8 out of the 41 have signed any 
of the Tokyo Round Agreements of 1979.10 Ginther11 
argued that GATT is a major example of operation of 
international law in general and the development of 
international economic law in particular. The existing 
rules of MFN will never aid the growth of trade in 
Africa. 
It is to be expected therefore, that African states, which 
so far have largely neglected GATT rules, in future will 
develop a stronger interest in regional trade and 
contribute to its progressive development.  It is argued 
that even though the nature of GATT law and its 
evolution is of particular interest for international law 
and international economic law in particular, the rules 
are imbalanced. They were not made in contemplation 
of the African economic growth through tariff 
negotiations otherwise the Agreement on Textiles and 
Cotton and quantities restrictions would have reviewed.  
In appraising the success of GATT, one could easily 
detect that GATT, though has been successful in 
certain areas at the early days of Rounds between 
1950s12 and 1960s,13 the industrialised countries 
adopted its rules and used its mechanism to reduce 
trade barriers steadily within the period shortly after its 
formation. Regrettably, GATT has never been uniform 
in its effect. Member countries have been unwilling to 
liberalise certain areas of trade and those areas that 
were allowed have been fettered with exceptions. There 
is no way a new entrant from Africa would grow in 
trade at WTO because the fettered rules of GATT.14 
At the point when voting occurred, every 
nation had one vote and choices were made basically 
by a greater part. Generally, 66% lion's share of 
aggregate votes cast, with the greater part involving 
                                                           
8De-facto members of GATT in this sense are countries, to the 
territory of which the GATT rules have been applied before 
decolonization. Such countries would, after independence, maintain a 
de facto application of these rules pending a final decision as to their 
future commercial policy. This status allows the country concerned to 
benefit from most-favoured-nation treatment, without being itself 
obliged to enter into any new commitments. The other side to it is 
that much as they would benefit from the MFN treatment, they are 
bound by its rules and cannot not exercise an option.  
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 K. Ginther, “The New International Order, African Regionalism 
and Regional Attempts at Economic Liberation,” (1983), in K. 
Ginther W. Benedek (eds.), New Perspectives and Conceptions of 
International Law, An Afro-European Dialogue. Springer, Vienna, 
pp. 59 at 61. 
12 The first Trade Rounds of GATT negotiations were in Geneva in 
1947, known as the Geneva Tariff Conference. At the conference, 23 
original contracting parties participated. Also, the Annecy Round, 
was held between 1948 -1949, the Torquay Round was between 1950 
– 1951,   Geneva Round held between 1955 – 1956, the Dillon round 
and it was between 1960 – 1962. 
13 Geneva Round held between 1955 – 1956, the Dillon round and it 
was between 1960 – 1962. 
14A. Oxley “The Achievements of the GATT Uruguay Round” 
(1994) Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (), pp. 45-53, ANU Press. Accessed on the September m14, 
2016 at www.jstor.org.  
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more than a large portion of the nations, is required for 
"waivers." Sometimes between sessions of the 
contracting parties, the Council of Representatives, 
made up of agents of all individuals alluded to as "the 
GATT Council," was approved to follow up on both 
standard and pressing matters. The body meets once 
every month. The Major GATT standing advisory 
groups or boards incorporates the following areas. The 
underlining philosophy of WTO is its open markets and 
non-discrimination which are verbalized to be very 
conducive to the national welfare of all countries. The 
„raison d‟être of the WTO is to offer a mechanism to 
regimes of member countries to reduce both their own 
trade barriers and those in foreign markets. It is 
however different whether it is achieving this objective. 
Its primary functions are the focal points for the 
negotiation of binding objectives to reduce trade 
barriers and agree on disciplines for policies affecting 
international trade. WTO is to provide mechanism 
through which its members can enforce these 
negotiated commitments. 
Unfortunately, the modernization theory of 
development either through international trade or 
otherwise,  did not only concerned itself with economic 
development as it also took development as a process 
by which certain “traditional” or “backwards” societies 
would transform along a horde of dimensions to 
become “modern.” Equally true is the fact that many 
scholars from a range of disciplines shared the 
modernization ideas as an interdisciplinary subject 
which is very fundamental to forming a goal of 
developing theory for development.15 
It is clear that international trade and factors 
such as investment and labour productivity are critical 
to economic growth. Evidently, the provisions of 
GATT rules as annexed to WTO have not contributed 
much to the development of African trade.  This study 
posits that Africa and some other Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs)  have not been encouraged by the 
rules of GATT in terms of market share and trade 
development. This has not happened for the past sixty-
five syears of GATT‟s existence. This is understood 
on the ground that the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) was not a formal international 
organization; it was an international treaty to which 
countries and independent custom territories could 
become a contracting party. It is a model of 
„standalone international institution‟, independent of 
the United Nations (UN) system being none of the 
UN‟s specialized agencies.16 Reasoning from the 
above background, it is surprising that today, the 
WTO has become very important and a focal point of 
many of those countries opposing the process of 
globalization of the world economy.  International 
trade and foreign aid are two main instruments for 
                                                           
15  See Gilman‟s discussion paper at pp.77-79, which explained 
interdisciplinary aspects of modernization initiatives at Harvard, 
Yale, and Chicago. He traced interdisciplinary focus to Talcott 
Parson‟s search for a unified theory of social action in which the role 
of neoclassical economics were said to be limited. 
16 This is in contrast to other specialized intentional organizations 
such as WIPO, ITU, and UNCTAD. The WTO is  the successor to 
the GATT, which it has since subsumed.  
generating and reallocating wealth in the world 
economy to LDCs today.  Trade between OECD 
countries and the developing countries may have 
increased dramatically since the 1980s, rising in 
volume from around $730 billion in 1980 to more than 
$3.4 trillion in 2005,17 the volume of aid flows has 
been modest in comparison. The question is why is it 
very difficult for the combination of the two strategies 
(aid and international trade) to turn around the 
economies of the developing countries of Africa? The 
major challenge facing a large number of low-income, 
predominantly agrarian economies is the problem of 
how to break out of the vicious circle of low 
productivity and heavy dependence on a very small 
number of primary goods.18  Part of the problems can 
also be traced to the limited size of the domestic 
markets available for the goods produced by 
developing countries 
There is an increasing need to divert strategies 
from dependence on import of intermediate and capital 
goods from the industrialized nations. For instance, the 
effect of trade restrictions by Textile and Clothing 
(T&C) rule in Multifibre Agreement (MFA) of GATT 
has had negative impacts on African textiles export 
trading. The MFA has had a strong impact on both 
importing and exporting countries. 19 Also, in the area 
of consumer goods, the MFA affects consumers in 
importing countries by increasing prices of both 
domestic and imported T&C products. Also, the 
exporting countries are affected by a reduction in 
export opportunities. But in all, it has been contended 
by writers that it is partly offset by the „quota rent.‟  
Studies have shown that the export revenue of 
developing countries that is lost as a result of 
restrictions is substantial.20 The need to   expand export 
capacity, free trade in order to pave way to increase of 
international competitiveness which is adjudged to be 
very vital for a rapid growth  is a major reason for the 
existence of WTO.   
Africa, in the global dispensation faces 
challenge of industrialization and improvement of 
productivity which would lead to international 
competitiveness. This writer support the argument that 
Africa is least developed with particular reference to 
labour intensive products. This is may be due to the 
existing manufacturing industries established in the 
context of import substitution strategies. The post-
colonial era pursued this course. In modern 
development features, much of the capacities of such 
industries are no longer viable due to rapid growth in 
the policy and national environment. These are keys to 
issues affecting the parameters of their 
competitiveness. Africa is presently marginalized in 
world trade and this is mostly responsible for its 
inability to sustain a rapid growth. 21  
                                                           
17  UNCTAD, 2007 Report on development countries‟ trade 
exchange. 
18 “The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
Report.” (1999) James Currey Ltd. 
19 J. Goto, “The Multifibre Arrangement and Its Effects on 
Developing Countries.” (1989) The World Bank Research Observer, 
Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 203-227, Oxford University Press. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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A.  CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF 
THE “FAIR AND OPEN 
PRINCIPLE” OF GATT ON 
AFRICAN TRADE DEVELOPMENT. 
 
The principle of „open and fair‟ application of 
trade barriers is one of the major areas of operation of 
GATT rule. Tariffs are the most common and visible 
forms of trade barrier known to international 
commodity trading under the GATT rules. Hence 
tariffs were to be “bound” or set at minimum levels, 
and not to be incremented above the negotiated level. 
The question is what transpires if one of the WTO 
Member countries lacks economic power to negotiate 
tariffs which is quite often the case with Africa?  After 
all, there is an African adage which verbally expresses 
that, “it is the person who has the money that has the 
higher trade bargain.”  In the light with of the above 
adage, the principle of MFN as a GATT rule would 
apply automatically. However, another question is what 
if where, for instance, this principle applies but does 
not fall within the economic needs of a particular 
member country?  This engenders a lacuna in the “open 
and fair” principle of the rules of GATT. It need be said 
that the rules need urgent review to accommodate 
developing countries. Tariffs is said to be much more 
facile to indentify and to eventually reduced and this is 
what appraised the option of tariff as against the 
quantitative restriction option such as quotas rule.  
Another docile feature of WTO/GATT is that the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)‟s decision is 
not enforceable. The panel report can only carry some 
force of opinion and encourages countries to work 
towards an agreeable resolution.22 Contracting parties 
meets periodically to further negotiate reduction of 
trade tariffs and other trade barriers. The negotiations 
are referred to as “rounds.”  The sole reason for these 
negotiations is reduction of trade tariffs by member 
countries; which is one of the major objectives of 
GATT.   
B.   GATT AND PROTECTION OF 
TRADE THROUGH TARIFFS. 
  
In course of this research, we found the term 
“protection” does not appear per se in the WTO 
agreements; it is implicit in the term of „non-
discrimination.23 While there is no operative definition 
of the term “protection” in WTO‟s agreement, it 
                                                           
22 D. Palmeter and P. C. Mavroidis, ”The WTO Legal System: 
Sources of Law.” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
92, No.3, pp. 398 at 413. Assessed on October 13, 2016 at 
www.jstor.org. 
23  Since the 1980s, tariff rates have been significantly reduced 
around the world. Within Brazil, average tariffs 
dropped from nearly fifty percent in 1985 to twelve percent in 1995, 
and 10.4 percent by the start of 2005.For 
2004 figures, see Peter Hakim, “Two Ways to Go Global,” Foreign 
Affairs 148, (Jan.-Feb. 2002). See also P. K. 
Goldberg and N. Pavcnik, “The response of the informal sector to 
trade liberalization,” (2003),  72 Journal of Development Economics 
463, 473 (noting that “the average tariff declined from 58.8% in 1987 
to 15.4% in 
1998 in Brazilian manufacturing. 
captures some measures which may be taken primarily 
to be intended to favour domestic produce over foreign 
production. With respect to trade in goods, the form of 
protection available and allowed for domestic products 
is the tariffs. That is, WTO Members are not allowed 
nor permitted to use quotas to restrict trade in goods. 
African trade should have a central role in any "new 
round" of GATT negotiations. Having mentioned this, 
starting from the interest of each group, it is difficult to 
make an all-conclusive statement of what the interests 
of developed and developing countries in trade 
liberalization24 in today‟s economic reality.  This 
author argues that while the expansion of exports has 
been constrained by some existing import restrictions 
as well as the threat of the imposition of restrictions by 
some countries, the process of diversification in 
developing countries has permitted the increase of 
shares in developed countries markets for manufactured 
goods in an unfavorable African environment25. There 
is nothing on ground to make one understand that the 
tariff protection under the WTO had assisted the 
developing countries in Africa to develop more in 
terms of industrialization of manufactured goods. In 
order to ascertain  the interests of the wealthy nations in 
exchange of advancement, when it is contrasted with 
the developing nations, it is necessary to assess how 
trade liberalization had affected the volume and the 
pattern of developing countries‟ exports over the 
years.26  It is a well-known trait that as the only 
recognized trade organization of the world trade, WTO 
has also been subjected to critical scrutiny from various 
legal, political and theoretical persuasions and 
hypothetical influences over the years of its existence. 
27   
Trade exchange has been an essential element 
for worldwide social and political development. It is 
not as though the civil arguments about the 
effectiveness of the organization have not been 
examined, it has been scrutinised by individuals and 
writers. However, no tangible progress has brought 
changes to African trade as a result of these writings.  
The existing rules of GATT put a few nations at a more 
profitable positions than others in exchange dealings. 
For instance, in the Latin America structuralist reliance 
writing of the late 1960s and 1970s, there has been in 
existence of an option; a position that concentrated on 
the social and political relations of splendid relations 
among the developed and developing nations.28  
Certain measures were brought, amongst other things to 
create awareness on outcomes of the unequal trade 
value exchange between states. The fear expressed then 
                                                           
24 B. Bela “Trade Between Developed and Developing Countries: 
The Decade Ahead.”(1984) OECD Economic Studies.  Volume 3, at 
pp. 7-25,. This paper was prepared by the author during his 
consultancy for the OECD. The author is a Professor of Political 
Economy at the Johns Hopkins University and Consultant to the 
World Bank. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 R.  Higgott, H.  Weber, “GATS in Context: Development, an 
Evolving lex mercantoria and the Doha Agenda:  Review of 
International Political Economy.”  Vol. 12, No. 3 (Aug., 2005), pp. 
434-455.  Taylor & Francis, Ltd.  
28  See Higgot A. Richard , “Political Development Theory” (1983),  
Published by Kent: Croom Helm Ltd,  
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is still present today in round negotiations. The 
reflections of the earlier debates were spatially the 
construed North-South emphasis on inequality. 
Disappointingly, the present concerns are about trade 
and trade agreements which places emphasis on social 
and ecological considerations and the implications of 
production processes,29  rather than the social welfare 
of their member states. Noting this point further, Saurin 
states that the differences between the orthodox and 
heterodox approaches to development are to be found 
in their differing epistemologies and methodologies of 
evaluating poverty in world politics.30  The concerns 
for developing countries in evaluation of poverty is 
always in the news but on the other hand, when it 
comes to tariff negotiations especially, in agricultural 
products originating from developing countries 
(Africa), it is a question of competing priority for the 
developed countries of protectionism that always come 
to mind. Conceptualizing trade-development this way 
does not make WTO an organization that is said to be a 
„charge d‟affaire of the international trading 
communities, rather, it is a case of hijacking of bubble 
gum from the mouth of the infants – developing 
countries.  
III. QUESTIONING THE RULE OF NON-
DISCRIMINATION (ND) OF GATT. 
 
By definition, the non-discrimination rule 
means that both imported and locally produced goods 
should be treated equally. The purport of this provision 
is to the effect that it does not matter even if the quality 
of imported product is higher where the cost of 
production of locally manufactured product is 
additionally high; the price of the goods are to be 
treated as identical with the locally produced goods. 
This provision is believed to have brought inequality of 
opportunities between the industrial nations and the 
LDCs; because of subsistence of technological 
differences and bargaining power between the 
developed and developing countries. Flowing from the 
above, one is tempted to question how advantageous or 
remuneratively lucrative has the provisions of ND of 
WTO rules has been to the development of the 
economies of Africa especially, Nigeria as a member of 
the World Trade Organisation? Furthermore, is it 
possible for a country which produces its goods at a 
cost higher than the imported ones which have the 
same quality, to treats the same goods on equal basis? 
It is not most likely. It is argued in this study that the 
domestic goods will lose market based on the given 
price in the local market at the expense of imported 
                                                           
29 Ibid. 
30 S. Julian, „'Globalization, Poverty and the Promises of Modernity'” 
(1996) Millennium, Journal of International Studies, 25(3): 657-
80. 454, See also S. Julian “'The global production of trade and 
social movements: value, regulation, effective demand and needs” 
(1999)  in A. Taylor and C Thomas (eds) Global Trade and Global 
Social Issues, London: Routledge. M. Philip, “Globalization” 
(2005) in T. Janoski, R. Alford, A.M. Hicks and M. A. Schwartz 
(eds.) :A Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies 
and Globalization.” New York: Cambridge University Press. 
goods in developing countries but the reverse is the 
case in developed countries.  
This cannot produce economic advantage and will 
eventually lead to economic loss for the home grown 
industry. This is where the ND rule will never favour a 
growing economy such as Nigeria. The provision of 
this “Most favored nation” principle of trading between 
the industrialized and LDCs cannot help the trade of 
the developing country like Nigeria because the rules 
are the result of concession of Europe and America. It 
is argued that African continent was not in 
contemplation at the period when the concessions were 
made. On the other hand, it would be almost, if not 
impossible for any country in Europe to treat produced 
goods from Nigeria or any other part of African 
countries as equivalent with the goods manufactured in 
Europe for consumption in Europe. The foregoing 
discussion depicts the developing countries in Africa as 
sacrificial lamb at the altar of MFN rules.  Moreover, 
even the non-discrimination principle which is 
severally expressed to be the cornerstone of the 
GATT‟s operations leaves many rooms for doubt. This 
is because, there are many exception allowed as 
provisos in the non- discrimination rule. The exceptions 
are now an appendage to the trade development of 
African countries which were not privy to the 
formation of the rules in 1947.  
A.  The Positive and Negative Effects of “Most 
Favored Nation and Non –Discrimination” 
Rules of GATT. 
 
The objective of the multilateral trade created 
by GATT backed up by its commercial agreements 
serves as its rules. It is for the provision of industries 
and enterprises from different countries with stable and 
predictable environment with which the member 
countries of WTO can trade with each other. It was 
hopeful that the open and liberal system is expected to 
increase a greater investment through trade between 
countries; provides employment and thus promote 
economic development for all countries. Over the years 
of existence of WTO, developing countries have been 
strong supporters of a non-discriminatory rule-based 
multilateral system of international trade.31 This 
argument is built on the background that as 
economically small units, the LDCs would otherwise 
be subjected to bilateral pressures from larger powers.32  
It is a paradox that they have equally been committed 
to a special-and-differential (S&D) treatment for 
themselves under GATT rules. This particular rule is 
itself a deficit in promotion of trade for Africa.  At the 
time, the developing countries were of the view that 
their problems are special from those of the developed 
countries; some balances–of-payment problems, which 
is thought to be prevalent and endemic to low income 
counties. But this was not the case as the “special and 
differential treatment” thought achieved, became a 
Trojan Horse in the economic growth in the continent.  
                                                           
31 J. Whalley, “Non-Discriminatory Discrimination: Special and 
Differential Treatment under the GATT for Developing Countries” 
(1990), The Economic Journal, Vol. 100, No. 403 pp. 1318-1328. 
Wiley on behalf of the Royal Economic Society.  
32 Ibid.  
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The rules of nondiscrimination are embodied 
in the Most-Favored-Nation rule (MFN). It states 
amongst other things that trade must not be 
discriminatory. It further means that where member 
country grants a tariff to any country or any other 
benefit, same most immediately be extended to the like 
- product of all other member countries. Thus, where 
Country A agrees on trade negotiations with B, to 
reduce custom duties on import of cocoa from 20 
percent to five percent, the reduced rate must be 
extended to all WTO member countries. This 
obligation applies to both import and export products. 
In the same way, where a country levies duties on 
export of a product to one destination, it must in the 
same way apply the same rate its  exports of all 
destinations. 
B.  Some Exceptions to the MFN Rule.  
The GATT rules recognized that tariff and 
other barriers to trade can be reduced where they 
meet certain criteria. The criteria are referred to as 
preferential basis by countries under regional 
arrangement. The duty-free rates available to 
countries under regional arrangements need to be 
extended to other countries. Regional preferential 
arrangement constituted an important exception to 
the MFN rules. Also, in order to protect the interest 
of non member countries, the conditions for 
forming such arrangement are very strict as laid 
down by GATT. They include the following:33 
i. That member country of Regional arrangement 
must remove tariffs and other barriers to trade 
affecting substantially to all trade between 
them.34 ii. That the arrangement should not 
result in imposition of new barriers to trade 
with other   countries. 
The arrangement may take the form of customs unions 
or free – trade areas. In either of the two areas, trade 
takes place in duty – free basis among member states 
while other countries continue to be subject to MFN 
tariff rates. However, in the case of customs unions, the 
tariffs of member countries are harmonized and applied 
to imports from outside countries on a uniform basis. 
Also, in free-trade areas, member countries continue to 
use the tariffs without harmonization  as set out in their 
individual national schedules. 35 In the Uruguay Round, 
some wonder why the developing countries shifted 
their position a bit from their earlier positions of S&D 
bloc-wide strategy.  
The declaration which launches the Round 
contains a very clear and unequivocal reaffirmation of 
S&D treatment principle of the trading systems, but it 
also proposes a possible reform of Article 18 (b) of 
GATT as this has been raised by the developed 
countries, and generalized system of preference 
graduation pressures against developing countries 
                                                           
33 GATT, 1994, Article XXXIV 
34 GATT, 1994, Article XXXIV: 5. 
35 GATT, 1994, Article XXXIV: 8.  
which had already built-up outside the round.36 
However, Article 18 (b) is available only to developing 
countries, and its provisions are less challenging than 
those of Article 1237. Consultations must takes place in 
the Balance-of-Payments Committee every year in the 
case of countries invoking Article 12, and every two 
years if Article 18 (b) is involved.38 Developing 
countries have frequently pointed to the general 
language in the Punta del Este Declaration thus: 
'Developed Contracting 
Parties shall therefore not 
seek, neither shall less-
developed Contracting Parties 
be required to make 
concessions that are 
inconsistent with the latter's 
development, financial, and 
trade needs,  as justifying 
some form of partial or full 
exemption from at least some 
of any new disciplines 
(especially in agriculture).‟ 39
  
As stated by Whalley,40 „what exactly has 
S&D yielded to developing countries in concrete trade 
policy terms over the years has also been a subject of 
debate. Since when the idea of S& D became 
acceptable by the developed countries, it appears that 
the differences between developing countries 
(large/small, middle-income, least-developed, 
industrialized or community exports, agricultural 
importers and others are said to have grown, 41 but there 
is not in existence any empirical evidence of the notion.  
This lack of coherent empirical examination was what 
led to the grand alliance of coalition of all developing 
countries in the Uruguay Round in active voice. In 
recent years, a lot has been said about the proliferation 
of import restrictions that represent non-tariff barriers 
to trade in the developed countries.42 Balassa 
mentioned that the long recession of the years 1980-82 
has in fact led to the imposition of some protectionist 
measures in the United States and in the European 
Economic Community. However, he further mentioned 
that it was not as the same pervasive restrictions as the 
international cartels of the 1930s43. At WTO, the 
principle of non-discrimination has just two 
                                                           
36 In Article 18 (b), and Article 12, are also GATT articles which 
permits countries to use trade restrictions when foreign exchange 
reserves are considered to be at unacceptably low levels while 
emphasis is placed on minimizing the disruption of trade. In 
Article I2,  it is stated that if a full employment policy raises 
import demand and creates a balance-of-payments problem 
leading to the imposition of trade restrictions, no case can be made 
for modifying the policy in order to eliminate the foreign exchange 
shortage. Similar wording exists in Article I8 (b), referring in this 
case to development policy. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Supra note 41. 
43 Ibid. 
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components. One is the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
rule and the other is national treatment (NT) principle.  
The MFN rule is to the effect that a product 
made in one Member country be treated with no less 
favour less than a “like” (very similar) product that 
originates in any other country.44 When a country 
becomes a member of the WTO, it expects that all 
other member countries will trade with it on the 
principle of non- discrimination that exists in the form 
of the most favored nation rule. To be treated without 
discrimination, certain exceptions are the right of a 
WTO member country.45 The provision assumes the 
position that „national treatment‟ requires that foreign 
products – once they have satisfied whatever border 
measures are applied and have paid off tickets of entry 
in a particular market, they must also equally be treated 
no less favourable than the direct competitive domestic 
products. While this provision seem very inviting and 
promising, it sounds very far from  reality especially, 
where it concerns goods emanating from developing 
countries to developed nations. On paper, it seems to 
apply to both fiscal and other policy regulations, while 
the obligation is to provide foreign products favourable 
than those afforded to their domestic counterpart 
especially in developing countries like Nigeria.  This is 
the problem to a growing economy of African 
countries.  Furthermore, where any government is free 
to discriminate in favour of foreign products against 
domestic products which are the cases in most African 
countries, subjected to the MFN rules, it therefore 
means that all foreign products must be given equal 
treatments in a growing economy like Nigeria. Take the 
case of vehicle spare parts for instance; the used parts 
imported from Europe and America are more 
preferable to the new ones available in LDCs. The used 
parts are even more expensive compared to the newly 
manufactured ones in some of these countries. This is 
an aspect which makes the MFN rules to apply 
unconditionally and unquestionably to all nations as 
WTO members non meritorious. Its foundation is very 
suspicious from inception.  Even though some 
exceptions are made for the formation of free trade 
areas or customs union, preferential treatment of 
developing countries is such that upon accession of a 
new Member, an existing Member may invoke the 
WTO‟s non-application clause46. The application of 
this rule does not result to rapid development in a 
growing economy like Africa. Furthermore, this writer 
is of the view that Africa stand to swallow a bitter pill 
of having to confront these exclusion clauses which is 
“a free for all existing members” of WTO. For 
instance, where policy does not discriminate between 
certain foreign suppliers47, importers and consumers 
will continues to have incentives to source from the 
                                                           
44 Article XIII, this provision was at the time reasonable because 
during the formation of GATT, the membership were only 23 and 
most of the developing countries  are either not industrialized or do 
not produce enough to export. The circle of membership was within 
Europe and America.  
45 P. Ranjan, “Applicable Law in the Dispute Settlement Body of the 
WTO” (2009) Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 15 (Apr. 
11 - 17, pp. 23-27. Economic and Political Weekly. 
46 See Article VIII of WTO which gives Members certain rights. 
47 Id, at page 16. 
lowest-cost foreign suppliers. It has been argued that 
non-discrimination is an effective defense against 
„concession erosion‟ which could otherwise materialize 
and give negotiators less incentive to continue 
liberalizing.48 It is however argued in this study that it 
can only favour the developed countries. This study 
argues that the provision can only favour the developed 
countries against the less developed countries.  
 
 
C.   The Politics of MFN Rule 
One area of importance in the study of MFN 
rules of GATT is the political-horse-riding. It offers 
smaller countries a guarantee, meaning that larger 
countries will not exploit their market power against 
them. The rules equally give better treatment to 
competitors for foreign policy reasons. A striking 
feature of economic advancement all over the world is 
trade and product competition. The law which regulates 
GATT is by mere accession and does not constitute an 
obligation. This makes it difficult to prevent developed 
countries from promoting their exports to the 
developing countries. The developed countries have 
economic advantages over the developing countries. 
This advantages span through technology and 
bargaining power.   
          The post-Tokyo round came as a result of the 
underpinning of the developing countries trade which 
was not given the chance to compete with the Americas 
and the European tariffs on such goods which tariffs 
remained somewhat higher than the overall average. 
The United States was 9 and 7 percent; Europe was 7 
and 6 percent while Japan was 7 and 5 percent. 
Comparing the above with the tariffs on the developed 
countries import from the developing countries, it 
appears there is no such comparism as to what obtains 
in the developing countries. The explanation is that 
there are higher tariffs on goods imported from 
developing countries than all the manufactured imports. 
For instance, the United States has the tariffs of 10 
percent or the application of 20 percent higher on their 
overall manufactured imports.49 Equally, in European 
Economic Community, the figure is 12 and 6 percent 
while the figures are 18 and 13 percent for Japan.50  
Balassa51 further argues that the decline of imports 
from developing countries can be attributed to the 
decline in GNP growth rates in the developed countries 
rather than increased protection. This writer does not 
agree with the above contention because there is 
                                                           
48 Ibid. 
49B. Riley, “Tariff Reform Needed to Boost the U.S. Economy” 
(2013). Available at      
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2013/pdf/bg2792.pdf. Accessed 
on August 23, 2016. 
50 C. R. William, “Exports of Manufactures from Developing 
Countries: Performance and Prospects.” (1984)   OECD‟, and The 
impact of the Newly-industrializing Countries on Production and 
Trade in Manufacture 1979. 
51 B.C. Balassa "Industrial Protection in the Developed Countries" 
(1984), The  World  Economy, vol. 7, no. pp. 179-96, A Quarterly  
Journal  published  by the Trade Policy Research Centre, London., C. 
R. William (1984b), Exports of Manufactures from Developing 
Countries: Performance and Prospects Access. Report from the 
Commission to the Council on the State of the Shipbuilding.  
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nothing to show as evidence that the explanation by 
Balassa may be the case. 
The view of this writer is that the bates for 
growth of trade of developing countries is in the 
„Rounds of negotiations‟ with bulk of them negotiated 
ages ago before the developing countries came into the 
lime light of membership of WTO and afortiori, 
trading negotiation. It became too late for the 
developing countries to queue- in especially when 
tariffs in the framework of the Kennedy and the Tokyo 
rounds of negotiations, were basically the reduction of 
tariffs across board. Products of sensitive items of 
interest to developed countries like steel were made 
exception while developing countries‟ textiles and foot 
wares were excluded.   Again the tariffs have been very 
small on manufactured goods imported from the 
developing counties. Although, it was further argued 
that the extent of tariff escalation has been reduced, 
processing activities in the developing countries 
continue to suffer discrimination; tariffs are generally 
not based on unprocessed goods but rise with the 
degree of fabrication on processed goods especially 
from developing countries.  The argument is, whenever 
tariffs on output exceeds that of the nominal rate and 
the nominal rate is higher than the tariff on the inputs, it 
would record a relatively certain output tariffs which 
may give rise to high effective rates on protection of  
the processing activity52 of the home country.   
At the Uruguay „Rounds,‟ the developing 
countries puts up their argument for the unequal trade 
between the developed and the developing countries, 
their arguments were not treated on the basis of tariffs 
within the developing countries which are so small 
compared to their counterpart in the developed nations. 
This means there will never be equal trade benefit and 
trade bargain between the two sides. The foregoing 
goes to buttress the argument canvassed by 
Trachtman;53 who argues in his paper that WTO trade 
rules which came into existence are the result of years 
of hard negotiations and it involved huge economic and 
political bargains. This statement is only correct to the 
extent that the bargains were done by the developed 
countries to the exclusion of the developing countries 
which presently suffers from such hard negotiations.  
He noted further that if the delicate balance, if 
disturbed, will result in damaging consequences for the 
overall multilateral trade system, especially for 
developing countries and lease developed countries. 
Many objections raised by the developed nations which 
economic power is higher than those less developed 
nations do not presently board well for an effective 
negotiation for African countries.  
Additionally, it is trite to state that the present 
MFN rule does not benefit developing countries like 
Nigeria for simple reason that Nigeria does not have 
the political power and the wealth to force through 
rounds of negotiations. There is need to fashion a 
different way out in WTO for developing countries. 
The rules can be amended to incorporate the economic 
                                                           
52 Supra note 44 at page 58. 
53 P. Joel. Trachtman, “Jurisdiction in WTO Dispute Settlement" 
(2004) in Rufus Yerxa and Bruce Wilson (éd.), Key Issues in WTO 
Dispute Settlement: The First Ten Years (Cam- bridge: Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 132-43, (part b).   
needs of Africa especially, the Sub-Saharan countries 
of Africa like Nigeria. For instance, the Doha round 
deadlock is premised on disagreement based on 
agricultural tariffs which the developing countries were 
not allowed by the developed countries to shoot up. 
This disagreement is far from conclusion.  The 
developed nations were asking to push Intellectual 
property and services tariffs through. Despite the 
negative opposition by the developing countries, it 
sealed through but the demands of the LDCs on 
reduction of tariffs on Agriculture did not seal through. 
This is a power-based as against the rule-based 
negotiation. Where is equity in trade bargain for 
Africa? 
One is tempted to ask why powerful entities like the 
EC5 and the United States would support a consensus 
decision-making rule in an organization like the 
GATT/WTO, which generates hard law?54 In 
WTO/GATT rule, soft law is often considered to be 
inconsequential. This simply means that modifying the 
existing laws of the organization to accommodating 
new developments from developing countries are not 
currently in the purview of GATT big wigs member 
countries who calls the shot.  
It was clear from inception, the GATT 
agreement had no clear provisions for trade and 
development for developing countries of Africa55 It is 
argued that GATT is another club of rich nations. It 
was established to suit the economic interests of 
industrial powers and manipulate the weaker economic 
nations. For example, at the Havana Conference for 
International Trade Organization, the United States was 
opposed to the provisions that catered for economic 
development of any developing country. But the 
developing countries, understandably, had other 
ideas.56   Thus, the developing countries‟ wide range of 
proposals did not see the light of day during the 
Rounds negotiations. They called for positive transfers 
of resources. They also made demands in the field of 
trade policy which was indeed focused on securing 
liberation from the Charter's obligations. It was their 
hope to protect infant industries with certain measures 
which was not otherwise permitted. They sought to be 
permitted to receive new tariff preferences from other 
developed or developing countries. They wanted the 
right to benefit from developed-country tariff 
concessions without having to offer equivalent tariff 
concessions of their own.57 This proposal raises dust at 
the Round and hence the negotiations ended in several 
deadlock.  
D.   Special and Differential Treatment. The 
Banana Case of Latin America (LA) V. Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific Countries ACP). 
                                                           
54R. H. Steinberg, “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-
Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO” (2002) 
International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 pp. 339-374.. The MIT 
Press.  
55 It is true that GATT Article XVIII has an exception for developing 
countries, but its operation was difficult. It was also discriminatory 
since it was harder to evoke this article than GATT Article XII which 
grants exceptions more likely to be used by developed countries. 
56 K. Onyejekwe, “GATT, Agriculture, and Developing Countries”   
(1993) Hamline Law Review, 17, Available at  
www.NationalAgLawCenter. Accessed on 5/9/2016.  
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The term Special and Differential Treatment 'S 
& D' contains both an access component and a right-to-
bulwark component. In GATT, developing countries 
are given special treatment. The term 'S & D' contains 
both a right of entry constituent and a right-to-protect 
component.  This is contained under Articles 8, (28) 
(3), in Part IV, and the 1979 Framework Agreement 
known as the enabling clause.  Article I858 was GATT's 
first endeavor to abide developing country concerns. It 
is embedded with three components. Article 18 (a) 
sanctions developing countries to renegotiate tariff 
bindings in order to promote the establishment of a 
particular industry. A developing country utilizing this 
provision would be expected to offer compensation or 
face retaliation. Article I8 (b) is on the balance-of-
payments escape clause for developing countries. The 
18(b) is to the effect that criteria for imposing such 
restrictions are less onerous than the criteria which 
apply to developed countries under Article I2 of 
GATT. Article 18 (c) sanctions a developing country to 
apply quantitative import restrictions for the purposes 
of infant industry.  Article 18(a) is on tariff 
renegotiations while Article 18 (c) provides for 
compensation or retaliation in the absence of a 
negotiated agreement. One case analyses this provision. 
The case of Latin America v. African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries in differential treatment which was 
treated as follows. 
The Latin American case is a test case under 
the umbrella of non-discrimination (ND), and „Special 
and Differential Treatment‟ (SDT)  under GATT rules. 
Complaints were brought to GATT by the Latin 
American countries comprising of Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela (the LA 
countries) requesting a panel to examine the 1993 EEC 
regulation on the common organization of the market in 
bananas; composition of the panel which consist of the 
participation of other contracting parties. Their 
concerns were that since 1988, the EEC has been the 
world's most sizably voluminous importer of bananas; 
16% of EEC imports were supplied by Africa, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries; description of 
the five titles of the EEC regulation; under title IV, a 
certain quota of "traditional" ACP banana imports from 
other countries are duty free, whereas all other banana 
imports are subject to a tariff and these includes 
bananas from the LA countries.  
On January 8 1993, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela requested the European 
Economic Community ("EEC) to hold consultations 
pursuant to Article 23 (1) of the General In the EEC‟s 
view, this discussion could not be considered as 
measure under Articles 22 (1) or 23 (1) of the General 
Agreement (GA) sanctioning for formal consultations 
under one of these provisions (DS/38/4). On February 
                                                           
58 This provision is tagged, government assistant to development. It 
provides that LDC contracting parties are permitted under certain 
circumstances to impose quantitative restrictions in furtherance of 
their economic development programs or in response to foreign 
exchange problems attributable to their development status. LDCs 
are also allowed to withdraw from or modify a tariff binding or 
apply import quotas to establish or protect an "infant industry. 
19, 1993, the LA countries requested the EEC to hold 
consultations pursuant to Article .1 of the General 
Acquiescent concerning Council Regulation (EEC) No 
404/93 on the mundane organization of  the market in 
bananas, adopted by the EEC Council of Ministers at 
its session from 9 to 13 February 1993. Consultations 
were held between 22 March and 19 April 1993. The 
consultation did not result into a mutually copacetic 
solution of the matter, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela, in a 
communication dated 28 April 1993, requested that in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 23 (2) of the 
General Agreement; in sub paragraphs (a) and (b) 
thereof, a panel be established to examine the matter.59  
A panel was established by the Counsel on 
June 16, 1993 pursuant to paragraph F (a) of the 
Decision of the contracting parties of April 12, 1989 
authorising the Chairman of the Council to designate 
the Chairman and the Members of the Panel. The Panel 
would have standard terms of reference unless, the 
parties to the dispute concurred otherwise within 
twenty working days of the establishment of the Panel.  
Thus, on July 16, 1993, the Director-General of the 
governing council announced the composition of the 
Panel with Mr. Kesavapany as Chairman, Mr. Thomas 
Cottier and Mr. U Petereman as Members. The terms of 
reference of the Panel is to examine, in the light of the 
pertinent provisions of the GA, the matter referred to 
the contracting parties by Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Venezuela in document 
DS38/6 and to make such findings as will assist the 
contracting parties in making the commendations or in 
giving the rulings provided for in Article XXIII (2).  
Apart from the LA Countries which requested for the 
Panel, at the meeting of the Council dated July 1993, 
other countries‟ representatives - Antigua and Barbuda, 
Barbados, Belize, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ghana, Jamaica, Madagascar, 
Senegal, St Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago and Uganda 
expressed their respective government‟s wish to 
participate in the work of the Panel. While the Council 
took note of these statements, there was no consensus 
on such participation.  There were six African countries 
which request to participate. In the interest of 
transparency among the contracting parties having a 
substantial interest in the trade of bananas, the Council 
decided that it was reasonable to invite such countries 
to meetings of the panel and these countries were 
consequently invited to the meeting.  Arguments were 
taken from both sides, the LA countries argue that the 
EEC regulation contravenes the most favored-nation 
principle (MFN)  as importation of fresh bananas from 
African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) countries 
were obligation –free; while bananas from the Latin 
American (LA) countries are not treated the same
                                                           
59 Ibid at page 7. 
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way. The LA countries argue that the EEC regulation 
impairs the security and predictability of subsisting tariff 
concession.  The LA countries argued that the EEC 
regulation contravenes the most -favored-nation 
principle.60  
In the EEC‟s view, none of the previous panel 
reports referred to by the complainants could be 
interpreted in the way suggested by the complainants or 
had any relevance to the facts of this case. Arguing 
further, EEC states that several of the panel reports 
mentioned by the LA referred to measures "other than 
duties, taxes or other charges" whereas in this case it was 
a matter of tariffs, i.e. duties.  Concerning the alleged 
non-conformity of the licensing system, the EEC was of 
the view that the drafting history of Article X (1) 
confirmed that it banned prohibitions or restrictions on 
imports. It did not prohibit licenses, although if the 
prohibition (or restriction) was effected through quotas or 
licenses, it was subject to the rules of Article X (I55). 
Moreover,  two previous panel reports had clearly 
established that automatic licensing did not constitute a 
restriction within the meaning of Article XI (1).  
Furthermore, the EEC contended that the tariff 
preferences accorded to bananas from ACP countries, 
even if inconsistent with Article 1 (1) of the General 
Agreement, were justified under Article 24, read in the 
light of Part IV of the General Agreement. The EEC 
further explained that nearly all of the countries which 
were currently parties to the Lome Convention were 
earlier dependent territories of EEC member states. It was 
for this reason that France and the United Kingdom, who 
were original members of the General Agreement in 
1947, obtained the recognition of the existing preferences 
in Article 1 (2) and Annexes to the General Agreement. 
Moreover, Article 24 (9) of the GA specifically provided 
that these preferences could be maintained also in a 
situation where the contracting party having granted the 
preference became a party to a customs union or a free 
trade agreement in accordance with Article 24( 9).  The 
above case is just one out of many panel reports of fights 
on differentials treatment of countries under GATT 
operations; under the “most – favored nation” principle 
on Article 1 of the GATT.61  
E. The Quantitative Restrictions Rule of GATT: Tuna 
and Tuna Products Case
62
 
                                                           
60 Commodity Agreements, Art. XX  (h). See also, Article XI and 
Article XIII, Article XXIV and Part IV, Article III, National 
treatment on Taxation and Regulations, Preferential Treatment,  
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions and  non discrimination of 
administration of quantitative restrictions.  
61 Article 1 of GATT states that any advantage given by a contracting 
party to a product of another country must be extended 
unconditionally to a like product of all other contracting parties. 
However, it is observed that the definition of the term like product 
had over the years of rules of gate poses a lot of problems among 
member countries.  
 
62    U.S. and Canada complaints) [WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R, 
16 January 1998. See also the case of [WT/DS48/R/CAN, 18 
August 1997], 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/horm2.wp5. The meat 
and meat product case. 
The first rule is built around the recognition of 
members to follow open and liberal trade policies; and 
the need to protect domestic production from stiff foreign 
competition. Subject to elongating such protection is only 
through tariffs which must be kept at low levels. 
Countries are disallowed from employing quantities 
restrictions. The only exception is in certain designated 
areas.  The quantitative restriction rules were further 
reinforced in the Uruguay Round.63 Thus in the case of 
Tuna and Tuna products between the United States and 
Canada,  which fact is  the Canada's seizure of 19 U.S. 
Tuna boats which were caught fishing inside Canada's 
200-mile fisheries zone. The United States retaliated by 
prohibiting the importation of all types of tuna and tuna 
products from Canada pursuant to Section 205 of the 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. 
These events were a component of a broader 
disagreement between Canada and the United States of 
America relating to jurisdiction over Pacific fisheries. 
The matter was brought to GATT Dispute Settlement  
Body (DSB). The first issue to be resolved by the Panel 
was whether the U.S. import ban of all Tuna and Tuna 
products from Canada constitutes a quantitative 
"proscription" for purposes of the general prescriptions 
against quantitative trade measures in GATT as provided 
in Article X (1).64 The panel determined that the 
proscription did not fall under the exception in Article XI: 
2  (c)65 for limits on agricultural and fisheries imports in 
connection with domestic production restrictions. This, 
                                                           
63 N. S. Fieleke.”The Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations: An 
Overview” (1995) New England Economic Review, Vol 7. Available at 
https://www.bostonfed.org/-/media/Documents/neer/neer395a.pdf. 
Accessed on October 18, 2016. 
64 Article 10 (1) provides that all trade measures of Members should be 
published and therefore transparent. Laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made 
effective by any contracting party, pertaining to the classification or the 
valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or 
other charges, or to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports 
or exports or on the transfer of payments therefore, or affecting their 
sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing inspection, 
exhibition, processing, mixing or other use, shall be published promptly 
in such a manner as to enable governments and traders to become 
acquainted with them. Agreements affecting international trade policy 
which are in force between the government or a governmental agency of 
any contracting party and the government or governmental agency of 
any other contracting party shall also be published. The provisions of 
this paragraph shall not require any contracting party to disclose 
confidential information which would impede law enforcement or 
otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the 
legitimate commercial interests of particular enterprises, public or 
private. 
65 Article 11, The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not 
extend to the following: 11 (2) (c) Import restrictions on any agricultural 
or fisheries product, imported in any form,* necessary to the 
enforcement of governmental measures which operates:- 
(i)    to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product permitted to 
be marketed or produced, or, if there is no substantial domestic 
production of the like product, of a domestic product for which the 
imported product can be directly substituted; or    (ii)  to remove a 
temporary surplus of the like domestic product, or, if there is no 
substantial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic 
product for which the imported product can be directly substituted, by 
making the surplus available to certain groups of domestic consumers 
free of charge or at prices below the current market level; or (iii) to 
restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal product 
the production of which is directly dependent, wholly or mainly, on the 
imported commodity, if the domestic production of that commodity is 
relatively negligible.  
65  Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any 
product pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public 
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notwithstanding that the United States had circumscribed 
the catch by U.S. boats of some species of tuna, (e.g., 
Pacific and Atlantic yellow fin, and Atlantic bluefin and 
big eye).  The panel concluded that the exception did not 
apply because the reasons below: 
(i)  The ban applied to the catch of species (e.g., 
albacore and skipjack) whose domestic 
production the United States had not limited; 
(ii)  The ban was continued even after the limitation 
on the domestic catch of Pacific yellow fin tuna 
was ended; and (iii) While Article XI: 2 (a) 
(quantitative measures to relieve food shortages) 
and Article Xl: 2 (b) (quantitative measures for 
grading and classification) cover both 
"prohibitions" and "restrictions," Article X1:2(c) 
extends only to "restrictions." The U.S. ban was 
a prohibition.  
The Panel considers the claim of the United 
States to ascertain the measure it took in respect to 
prohibition of Tuna and Tuna products‟ importation from 
Canada. The Panel stated that the measure fell within the 
general exception in Article XX (g)66 for measures 
relating to the conservation of natural resources. The 
panel first admits to  the limitations in Article XX and 
further  noted that the United States "might not 
necessarily" have discriminated against Canada in an 
arbitrary or unjustifiable manner since it had taken similar 
actions for similar reasons against Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Mexico, and Peru. Furthermore, according to the panel, 
the U.S. action did not constitute a "disguised restriction 
on international trade" because it "had been taken as a 
trade measure and publicly announced as such. It need be 
stated that this is another advantage of the founders of 
GATT before other developing member countries joined 
the WTO.  
It is simply done, just as Steinberg puts it. 
„„Sovereign equality decision- making rules persist at the 
WTO because invisible weighting assures that legislative 
outcomes reflect underlying power, and the rules help 
generate a valuable information flow to negotiators from 
powerful states.67  This decision under Article XX is quite 
unfortunate because, it is a clear case of retaliation by the 
                                                                                              
notice of the total quantity or value of the product permitted to be 
imported during a specified future period and of any change in such 
quantity or value. Moreover, any restrictions applied under (i) above 
shall not be such as will reduce the total of imports relative to the total 
of domestic production, as compared with the proportion which might 
reasonably be expected to rule between the two in the absence of 
restrictions. In determining this proportion, the contracting party shall 
pay due regard to the proportion prevailing during a previous 
representative period and to any special factors* which may have 
affected or may be affecting the trade in the product concerned. 
66  Article XX provides that subject to the requirement that such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means  
of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the 
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or  
enforcement by any contracting party of measures:  Article XX (g) 
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption. 
67 Steinberg, Supra note 53  
United States to Canada.  It matters not that such actions 
were previously taken by the US against these countries 
mentioned by the Panel. When US took such measures 
against the countries, it was not a case before the Panel 
and therefore, each case ought to have been decided on its 
own merit.  
The second rule of GATT is the provision for 
reduction and administration of tariffs and other barriers 
to trade through multilateral negotiations. Most times the 
reduced tariffs are displayed on tariff line basis on the 
schedule of each country‟s concessions. The given rates 
in the schedules are also known as bound rates. The 
obligation of every member countries not to increases 
tariffs above the bounded rates shown is usually 
contained in their schedules. This is a domination of 
power show by the founding fathers of GATT/WTO. The  
particular rule was already in existence when Sub-
Saharan Africa was not in contemplation of its trade 
development. We believe this is a  trade growth minus for 
an emerging economy this region. The developing 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are incapable of facing 
stiff competition with developed economies.  
It is more worrisome that no single nation or a 
combination can change GATT/WTO rules, not now and 
the future hope of changing it is very dim too.  It is even 
more worrisome that the available literatures are replete 
with the views that developing countries 68should applaud 
and participate in the WTO trade system.69 They
 
argue 
that this should mean prosperity for all countries by 
laissez-faire economic principles but neglect and forget 
that fact that GATT rules as set up in 1947 is a actually a 
wed of commercial  which disfavours African 
development through trade at the world trade 
organization because all the rules of GATT are annexed 
to WTO and functional commercial agreement.  
Practically, notion of growth by laissez-faire has 
not been the case with WTO as the expectations from the 
developing countries will never be met by the structure of 
its governing rules.   It is crucial to understand how law-
based bargaining power works in the GATT legislative 
context. The starting point is the procedural rules 
employed by the developed country members. In most of 
the plenary meetings of sovereign equality organizations, 
GATT inclusive, diplomats entirely respect the right of 
any member state to attend; intervene; make a motion; 
take initiatives (raise issues); introduce, withdraw, or 
reintroduce a proposal or amendment; and block the 
consensus of unanimous support required for action. With 
this in mind, one is tempted to ask where laid  the 
economic power of developing countries with economic 
power for weighted vote in order  to nullify unanimous 
                                                           
68 The meaning of the word "developing countries," "less developed 
countries," and "Third World," etc., are often used interchangeably but 
the  term "developing countries" is used for consistency only meaning 
developing nations.  
115 J. Whalley, “The  Uruguay Round And Beyond” (1989); T. Takase, 
“The Role of Concessions in the 
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decisions of the rich nations on rounds negotiations? 
Another area is how does this work with the principle of 
“when a country becomes a member of the GATT/WTO, 
it expects that all other member countries will trade with 
it on the principle of non- discrimination existing in form 
of the MFN rule?  It is our understanding and belief that 
there need to address some certain lacunas in the 
operative principles of GATT.  
The revenues of developing countries which are 
disoriented as a result of restrictions are quite 
substantial.70.  The organ which oversees the 
Arrangement is the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs (GATT). The MFN rules have been renewed three 
times since inception. The current agreement-MFN 
Article IV runs through July 1991.71  The general 
contention is that the MFN rules contribute more to the 
economic development of unrestricted or less restricted 
developing countries. The other side of this argument is 
that the restricted developing countries that are major 
Textile and Cotton (T&C) exporters. However, it has 
been argued that the MFA additionally affects trade 
patterns of developing countries of Africa because of the 
difficulties in negotiating new tariffs by developing 
countries at the WTO negotiating rounds table.  
MFN consists of discriminatory quotas. This 
assertion is based on the fact that it can divert trade from 
more restricted to less restricted countries. 72  This 
practice  often lead to a steady trade diversion and such 
trade diversion occurs in favour of the exports goods 
from industrial countries because the MFN rule of 
restrictions is only applied to developing countries.  Such 
diversion may occur among developing countries. 
Although, they are not restricted equally,73 such 
restrictions are more exposed to developing countries.74   
It is virtually infeasible for a country like Nigeria to 
develop its trade under the MFN rule because of the 
above enumerated reasons.    
The rule which provides that members are to be 
treated without discrimination has certain exceptions. 
Such exceptions are said to be the right of a WTO 
member country.75 For instance, in international trade 
operations, the rules have never transmuted from tagging 
Africa as traditional, rural convivial structures, high 
population magnification; and widespread penuriousness. 
We must differentiate the calibers of economic 
development of LDCs. (Citation) 
Ali and Yusuf 76 opined that that despite poverty of the 
country-side and urban shanty-towns of developing 
nations, the ruling elites of most world –over are opulent. 
                                                           
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
73 D. B. Keesing, and M. H. Wolf. Textile Quotas against Developing 
Countries” (1980)  London: Trade Policy 
Research Center. 
74 Ibid.  
75P. Ranjan, “Applicable Law in the Dispute Settlement Body of the 
WTO” (2009), Economic and Political   Weekly, Vol. 44, No. 15pp. 23-
27.  Economic and Political Weekly.    
76 M. Ali and I. Yusuf, “Bretton Wood Institutions and the third World: 
Impact of the World Bank and the IMF on 
The Economy of Nigeria. (citation is needed). 
What Ali and Yusuf did not mentioned in their study is 
that if few people are wealth in a country where tons of 
hundreds of thousands are living below $1 dollar per day; 
the few affluent people are additionally poor by 
implication restiveness of the poor people. The question 
is how has GATT contributed to develop the least 
developing countries „trade through its laws? The GATT 
rules which govern the trade relationship between the 
developed and least developing countries are presently 
unfavourable to Africa. The conditions in Asia, Africa, 
Oceania and Latin America are previously linked to 
inclusion of the least developed countries of Africa by 
international capitalist economy. The situation is not the 
same today in terms of development 
F.  Transparency Doctrine of GATT. 
Transparency is a legal obligation. As a matter 
of rule, WTO members are thus required to publish their 
trade regulations. Members are enjoined to establish and 
maintain institutions sanctioning for the review of 
administrative decisions affecting trade.  The reason for 
the above is to enable them to respond to requests for 
information by other members and to also notify changes 
in trade policies at the organization (WTO), at all times. 
Presently, there are over 300 notification requisites 
embodied in the sundry WTO agreements and its 
decisions. These internal transparency requisites are 
supplemented by multilateral surveillance of trade 
policies by WTO Members. It is facilitated by periodic 
country specific reports. 77    Additionally, the body takes 
the issue of transparency very earnest because it is vital in 
terms of ownership of WTO as an institution in case 
citizens do not know what the organization does. 78 In 
WTO, the trade policy reviews contains series of useful 
information which may be used by civil society. 79   
Transparency is prima facie taken to reduce 
trade policy-related uncertainty as it puts an investor on 
the knowledge of the country of it e intends to invest.  
Even though the doctrine of transparency is expressed to 
be active in WTO, it is argued that the consensus process 
shows that the rules quite often generates informative on 
state preferences with  makes it possible for the 
formulation of legislative packages which favor intrigues 
of economically potent states.  Taking these rules into 
consideration, it signifies that the participating states as a 
matter of rule must accept and generally considered the 
rules legitimate. This rule is not a fair deal to incipient 
economic members of WTO.  The unfair deal as stated 
made the GATT consensus decision-making process an 
organized hypocrisy if viewed from the procedural 
                                                           
 77 These reports are referred to as Trade Policy Reviews in most 
Member Countries prepared by WTO‟s Secretariat and discussed in the 
WTO Council  referred as the Policy Review Mechanism. .  
78 In essence the word transparency in the context of the WTO is used to 
signify one of the fundamental principles of its agreements: the aim to 
achieve a greater degree of clarity, predictability and information about 
trade policies, rules and regulations of Members. In order to ensure that 
this concept works, all Members use notifications. For instance, under 
the Agreement on Agriculture, notifications are used to follow the 
implementation of commitments, inter alia, in the areas of subsidies and 
market access, while under the SPS Agreement; notifications are used to 
inform other Members about new or changed regulations that affect 
their trading partners. 
79 Id. 
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context.80 It is noted, in some rounds, GATT/WTO 
employs legislative decision making as primary law-
based related but others have additionally been primarily 
power-based. As observed by Steinberg, since the Dillon 
Round, some trade rounds have been launched through 
law- based bargaining which has yielded equitable, pare 
to-improving contracts;81 designing the topics to be 
addressed. However, he verbally expresses that, to 
varying degrees, rounds have been concluded through 
power-predicated bargaining that has yielded 
asymmetrical contracts favoring the machinations of 
potent economic states.  
The agenda-setting process (the formulation of 
proposals that are arduous to amend, which takes place 
between launch and conclusion, has been dominated by 
advanced economic countries. The ascendance of 
members depends on a larger degree to which potent 
countries have orchestrated to utilize their politics to 
conclude the rounds. The utilization of power as 
mentioned above is centered on hard negotiations which 
most of the developing countries are not able to compete 
with the advanced countries in terms of technical know-
how knowledge based institutions and currency power. 
Another angle to this discourse is the procedural fictions 
of consensus and the sovereign parity of states. These 
have over the years accommodated as an external display 
to domestic audience to help legitimize WTO outcomes. 
This is lamentable. The utilization of raw power that 
demonstrates the Uruguay Round has exposed WTO‟s 
existence as jeopardizing the legitimacy of its discussion 
outcomes. The economically impotent countries cannot 
impose an alternative rule but stick to rules of GATT 
annexed to WTO even when such rules are to the 
disadvantages of their state‟s economy. 
The World Trade Organization was established 
to fill the lacuna found in GATT. The lacuna is simply 
that GATT lacked an institutional structure in the early 
years of its operation because it did not exist as an entity. 
It became relevant when formal meeting of the 
contracting parties were held. WTO became prominent in 
today‟s relevance because of the institution design that 
GATT had formerly put in place through the art of 
“learning by doing process.” Part of the preambles of the 
GATT 1947, amongst other thing includes raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large 
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, developing the full use of the resources of the 
world and expanding the production and exchange of 
goods. Noting from the above is the question of whose 
goods do the phrase; „expanding the production and 
exchange of goods‟ refers.  
 We  posit that in effect, WTO agreement is a 
single undertaking – as all its provisions apply to all its 
members at its formation.  Of notable progress is the 
major difference in the dispute settlement area. It is 
observed from the study that the only notable difference 
between the 1947 GATT and the present GATT is the 
dispute settlement  approach. Under the WTO in 1947, it 
is almost impossible to prevent the formation of dispute 
                                                           
80 Steinberg, supra note 52 at page 24. 
81 Ibid. 
settlement panels, and the adoption of panel reports and 
the authorization to retaliate, but this is presently possible 
in GATT.   
 
Noting further, under GATT, there is stronger 
policy of WTO‟s mandate to pursue transparency and 
surveillance functions in part through the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism.  The literatures available on WTO 
describes it as both a mechanism for exchange or trading, 
trade policy commitments, and agreeing on a code of 
conduct which regulates members. WTO comprises 
negotiated sets of specific legal obligations which 
regulate trade policies of member states as contained in 
GATT-1994. The WTO does not seek to control trade 
flows or trade outcomes but its functions are relevant in 
other areas. The understanding which is yet to be 
explained is how the WTO assisted the LDCs in 
economic development since its establishment.  The 
LDCs of Africa continuous in abject poverty wallow in 
certain specific economic disabilities which have 
thoroughly distinguish them from LDCs. 82 Most LDCs in 
Africa cannot establish a sound economic growth because 
of the several economic constraints.83  
The growth recorded in LDCs is very 
disappointing especially in Africa. In the past three 
decades, no meaningful development has been achieved 
through GATT rules. The non- performance in the 
economic sector has presented a challenge which calls for 
unquestionable immediate attention for readjustment of 
the some GATT rules.  For instance, the per capita 
income in low-income Africa stagnated at only 0.1% 
annually between 1980 and 1985 and 1.1% between 1986 
and 1990, compared with growth rates of 2.0% and 2.6% 
representing low-income Asia and of 2.6% and 3.3% in 
developing countries in general.84  The saving potentials 
in LDCs are not achievable because of the limited growth 
due mostly to the pursuit of wrong targets and often 
misplaced priorities. The above factors are attributed to 
GATT rules but lack of political will and misplaced 
priorities.  These reduce the impact of capital 
accumulation and investment strategies. 85  
The role of Africa in WTO is questionable. 
Reason being that, before and after its membership, there 
has been no known notable economic success recorded.  
At least, conventional wisdom holds that WTO is a 
system which evolved from a power-based to a rule-based 
regime86. Africa was not in the least thought of at the 
point of decision-making in the formative stage. 
Pauwelyn argues that at the creation of WTO, was a 
bundle of unidirectional process of legalization where 
trade law has gradually replaced trade politics.87 In 
                                                           
82 See U. Ezenwe, “The Development of the Least Developed Countries 
of Africa: A Challenge to the International Economic System”. 
(1983) Africa Development / Afrique et Développement , Vol. 8, 
No. 2,  pp. 5-16. CODESRIA. Accessed on July 14, 2016 at 
www.jstor.org. 
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 J. Pawley, “The Transformation of World Trade.” (2005)  Michigan 
Law Review, , Vol. 104, No. 1, pp. 1-65. The Michigan Law Review 
Association.  Accessed on August 16, 2016 at www.jstor.org. 
87 Supra note 28. See also J. Goldstein et al., “Introduction: Legalization 
and World Politics,” (1982) 54 INT'L ORG. 385, 389 (referring to a 
victory for trade "legalists" over trade "pragmatists"); Miguel Monteria' 
i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution 
African Trade Growth or Trade Deficit: GATT/WTO Rules as Trojan Horse on African Trade Development 
 
                                                                           83                                                                            www.wjrr.org 
particular, the creation of the World Trade Organization 
("WTO"), 88twenty years ago is commonly seen as a 
constitutional moment when the stability of the rule of 
law finally was eclipsed in the caprices of politics and 
diplomacy89 campaign.   WTO maintains certain legal 
obligations at its formation in adherence to WTO, there 
are three legal areas which can be assumed. 
 
G. Does GATT Rules Promote African Trade 
Development? 
The World Trade Organization was established 
to fill the lacuna found in GATT. The lacuna is simply 
that GATT lacked an institutional structure in the early 
years of its operation because it did not exist as an entity. 
It became relevant when formal meeting of the 
contracting parties were held. WTO became prominent in 
today‟s relevance because of the institution design that 
GATT had formerly put in place through the art of 
“learning by doing process.” Part of the preambles of the 
GATT 1947, amongst other thing includes raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large 
and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, developing the full use of the resources of the 
world and expanding the production and exchange of 
goods. Noting from the above is the question of whose 
goods do the phrase; „expanding the production and 
exchange of goods‟ refers.  
 We  posit that in effect, WTO agreement is a 
single undertaking – as all its provisions apply to all its 
members at its formation.  Of notable progress is the 
major difference in the dispute settlement area. It is 
observed from the study that the only notable difference 
between the 1947 GATT and the present GATT is the 
dispute settlement  approach. Under the WTO in 1947, it 
is almost impossible to prevent the formation of dispute 
settlement panels, and the adoption of panel reports and 
the authorization to retaliate, but this is presently possible 
in GATT.   
 
Noting further, under GATT, there is stronger 
policy of WTO‟s mandate to pursue transparency and 
surveillance functions in part through the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism.  The literatures available on WTO 
describes it as both a mechanism for exchange or trading, 
trade policy commitments, and agreeing on a code of 
conduct which regulates members. WTO comprises 
negotiated sets of specific legal obligations which 
regulate trade policies of member states as contained in 
GATT-1994. The WTO does not seek to control trade 
flows or trade outcomes but its functions are relevant in 
other areas. The understanding which is yet to be 
explained is how the WTO assisted the LDCs in 
economic development since its establishment.  The 
LDCs of Africa continuous in abject poverty wallow in 
                                                                                              
of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 
(1993); Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Jurisdiction of 
International Trade Relations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775, 777 
(1996-97). 
88  Pawley, Supra at page 42.  See Marrakesh Agreement establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 08 State.4809, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 14. 
89  Id.  
certain specific economic disabilities which have 
thoroughly distinguish them from LDCs. 90 Most LDCs in 
Africa cannot establish a sound economic growth because 
of the several economic constraints.91  
The growth recorded in LDCs is very 
disappointing especially in Africa. In the past three 
decades, no meaningful development has been achieved 
through GATT rules. The non- performance in the 
economic sector has presented a challenge which calls for 
unquestionable immediate attention for readjustment of 
the some GATT rules.  For instance, the per capita 
income in low-income Africa stagnated at only 0.1% 
annually between 1980 and 1985 and 1.1% between 1986 
and 1990, compared with growth rates of 2.0% and 2.6% 
representing low-income Asia and of 2.6% and 3.3% in 
developing countries in general.92  The saving potentials 
in LDCs are not achievable because of the limited growth 
due mostly to the pursuit of wrong targets and often 
misplaced priorities. The above factors are attributed to 
GATT rules but lack of political will and misplaced 
priorities.  These reduce the impact of capital 
accumulation and investment strategies. 93  
The role of Africa in WTO is questionable. 
Reason being that, before and after its membership, there 
has been no known notable economic success recorded.  
At least, conventional wisdom holds that WTO is a 
system which evolved from a power-based to a rule-based 
regime94. Africa was not in the least thought of at the 
point of decision-making in the formative stage. 
Pauwelyn argues that at the creation of WTO, was a 
bundle of unidirectional process of legalization where 
trade law has gradually replaced trade politics.95 In 
particular, the creation of the World Trade Organization 
("WTO"), 96twenty years ago is commonly seen as a 
constitutional moment when the stability of the rule of 
law finally was eclipsed in the caprices of politics and 
diplomacy97 campaign.   WTO maintains certain legal 
obligations at its formation in adherence to WTO, there 
are three legal areas which can be assumed. 
H. Definition Difficulties of “Likeness   Products.” 
  The first issue which would be discussed under 
this heading is the tariff cases which emerged at the early 
period of GATT rules due to arduousness in relegation of 
products of homogeneousness nature. It was in context 
                                                           
90 See U. Ezenwe, “The Development of the Least Developed Countries 
of Africa: A Challenge to the International Economic System”. 
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and World Politics,” (1982) 54 INT'L ORG. 385, 389 (referring to a 
victory for trade "legalists" over trade "pragmatists"); Miguel Monteria' 
i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Resolution 
of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 
(1993); Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Jurisdiction of 
International Trade Relations, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 775, 777 
(1996-97). 
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that it is almost impossible for anyone to apply the 
concept of “likeness” without specifying the 
characteristics by which likeness is to be measured98in 
law, It was argued that it is difficult to tell whether one 
apple is “like” another apple without specifying whether 
or not; characteristics such as edible quality, taste, color, 
size or other features are relevant.99 In fact, however, it is 
quite mundane to compare different definitions of “like 
product” according to what looks akin to a single scale of 
“likeness. In the course of this study, the term “likeness 
product” was not defined in GATT but from difference 
cases, its meaning can only be inferred which is still 
subject to controversy.  
Notwithstanding the lack precise definition, 
there may be indefinable and describable difference in the 
policy context of sundry GATT Articles in which the 
terms has been utilized.  This study takes the stand; there 
is a lack of fundamental distinctions between the given 
names in meaning to the „like product‟ concept as 
presently provided in the GATT rule.  The provision 
under Articles I and III is unnecessary given the terms in 
which they are put to utilize especially where cases arose 
for settlement.  This study argues that in Article I.(1), the 
term „like product‟ 100ought to be interpreted in such a 
way as to give a refined distinction between products 
especially when it is applied to agreements backed up by 
tariffs. Hudec argues that it is quite prevalent to compare 
difference definitions of “like product” according to what 
looks homogeneous to a single scale of “likeness.” He 
gave an example two licit rulings, where one ruling 
verbalized that the only product “like” an apple is another 
apple, and the other ruling verbalizes that any edible fruit 
is “like” an apple.101  It can be argued that where this type 
of decisions are in issue, there is no arduousness in saying 
that the standard applied in the former decision requires a 
more preponderant degree of homogeneousness than the 
standard applied in the latter meaning. However, this is 
not always the case with the cases of GATT rule of 
“likeness product.”  
As stated in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,102 
paragraph 1 of Article III provides that Regimes should 
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Discrimination in World Trade Law” (2000), University of Michigan 
Press.  pp. 101-123. See for further readings on definition of like 
products, Berg, Dividing the Like-Product: Economics, the Law and the 
International Trade Commission, (1997) 20 World Competition Law 
and Economic Review, Vol. 73;  Berg, An Economic Interpretation of 
“Like Product,” (1996);  30 Journal of World Trade E 195, Steen, 
Economically Meaningful Markets: An Alternative Approach to 
Defining “Like Product” and “Domestic Industry” under the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979” (1987),  73 Virginia Law Review, 1459; 
Langer, “The Concepts of Like Product and Domestic Industry under 
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979” (1983),  17 George Washington 
Journal of International Law and Economics, 524. 
99 Ibid. See also the meat and meat product case.  Available at 
[WT/DS48/R/CAN, 18 August 1997], 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/horm2.wp5. Accessed on 
October 27, 2016. 
 
101  Ibid. 
102  Paragraph 2, Article III: The products of the territory of any 
contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting 
party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other 
internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party 
shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported 
not employ “internal” measures, denoting internal taxes 
or internal regulations to give auspice to domestic 
industry. This  rule is to the effect that internal measures 
must not give less propitious treatment to “like” foreign 
products, will only achieve this protection goal if “like 
[foreign] products” is defined to mean competitive 
peregrine products.  Some few examples of legal 
pronouncement on GATT rule will lay credence to 
whether the legal meaning is identically tantamount or 
authentically reflect the „likeness of products‟ with 
reverence to tariffs as contained in the rules. 103 
H. The Coffee Case under “Likeness Product” Rule.  
 
The GATT Panel committee on dispute 
resolution on the „likeness product,‟ right from the 1976 
had difficulties in defining and ruling on “like products” 
issue. For instance they commence their analysis by 
quoting a comment which apart from yielding any of the 
subject matter “likeness products,” only suggests the term 
“like or similar products” from a 1970 report of a 
Working Party on Border Taxes. After noting that the 
term appears sixteen times in the 1947 GATT agreement, 
the suggestion could not help to further the much desired 
definition of „like product.‟ 
The working panel given the task concluded that 
the term caused dubiousness, needed amelioration, and 
should be interpreted on a case-by-case substructure. This 
is without given any fine-tuned criteria categorical 
enough to be capable of governing its application in the 
long run. After rummaging through the provisions and 
rules of GATT, the working party went on to verbalize 
that in recent pasts, some criteria were only suggested for 
determining, on a case-by-case substratum. They did not 
verbally express whether a product is “similar”, the 
product‟s end-uses in a given market, consumers‟ tastes 
and habits, which transmutation from country to country 
would have been useful. They verbally expressed further 
that the product‟s properties, nature and quality would be 
the guiding principle. This is an ambiguous decision 
which can easily be swayed by power and politics of the 
sizably voluminous economy of the developed nation. 
The outcome of this decision was a subject of critique by 
developing countries. 
The rules and workings of WTO are geared 
towards the economies of the underdeveloped counties to 
the needs of industrialized countries which initiated the 
WTO/GATT. The resultant effect is that only a few 
economic activities such as cultivation of plantation crops 
and mining are left in the region of Africa. Furthermore, 
the prices of the products of these developing countries 
are usually determined by large buyers in the 
                                                                                              
or domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in 
paragraph 1. 
Paragraph 4, Article III: The products of the territory of any contracting 
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be 
accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like 
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, 
transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall 
not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges 
which are based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of 
transport and not on the nationality of the product. 
103  Ibid. 
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economically dominant countries of the West, and trade 
with the West provides almost all the LDCs‟ income. For 
this reason, it is difficult to measure growth in LDCs 
through GATT rules as aiding development of trade in 
Africa. For the last three decades, it has been difficult 
ensuring equality and a balance of trading system 
between the developing and developed nations due to 
domination of the West and the rest of Europe against 
Africa.  
Most conferences which had been held in 
reverence of development problems of LDCs are 
essentially built on academic approach. Despite the 
academic debate, the coalescence of the developing 
countries is hard to relegate as they are better described as 
hypothetical mainly from the conference platforms. 
Besides many approach, both in theory and practical that 
have been applied to the peregrine avail, the quandary of 
development in LDCs remain unresolved. It‟s doubtful  if 
the real  interest of the West is genuinely developing of  
the economies Africa amongst other LDCs with which 
they are in somewhat competition.  For instance, when 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) held its meeting in New Delhi 
in 1971, it was agreed between the developed nations that 
the industrial nations contribute at least 1 percent of their 
Gross National Input to the development of the LDCs. 
 It is on record that contribution of that 1 percent 
has never been thoroughly made by most of the 
development nations. 104   The intention is for 
maximization of liberation of commerce and navigation 
in international trade between develop and the developing 
countries. The object of developing the LDCs could have 
been easily achieved with straightforward legal 
contrivances, such as treaty clauses with reference to 
certain products between the developed and developing 
countries. It is contested that whatever economic 
development which has occurred in the LDCs could not 
have been distributed  fairly between nations or among 
population groupings within the nations of Africa.  
Presently, many LDCs are located in Africa, few in Latin 
America and Asia. For instance, there was no treaty 
clause providing for the „most – favored nations or 
national treatment regarding the markets from the LDCs. 
105  This is a deliberate omission. It is indispensable to 
draw attention to the whole of this chaotic picture in order 
to understand the multifaceted problem of international 
economic development of Africa. International 
development is confronted with issues which had been 
discussed over several decades.  
Another area of difficulty of the rules applied in 
like product is how the interest of developing countries 
would be protected in WTO in the case of countries of 
having the like product. Is there a possibility of structure 
and complementary interest from the angle of the 
„standard of national treatment‟ applicable in such 
circumstance? One wonders if there is a provision for 
                                                           
104 Ibid.  
105 G, Schwarzenberger, “The Province and Standards of International 
Economic Law” The International Law Quarterly, Vol, 2, No.3 1994 
at page 402-420. Cambridge University Press on behalf of the\British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law.   
standard parity, model equality between nationals and 
foreigners.  This provision under international economic 
law in the wake of WTO is deficit on the part of LDCs in 
Africa. For instance, commenting on Agricultural Trade 
restrictions from Africa by GATT rules, the tacit position 
taken by the United States is amazing. From the position 
of the US, one may easily arrive at a position that there 
can never be equality of treating the „nationals and 
foreign goods‟ in the application of WTO rules?  Another 
shocking example of how the US had indeed dwarfed 
African trade through restriction is the case of 
consumable goods by some citizens of African citizens 
living in the United States. The US made a law which 
prevents African delicacies, such as dried fish and „bush 
meats‟ exported from Africa from entering it shores 
because it law protect the killing of these animal even 
when it is not from its territory.  These sorts of goods are 
source of foreign exchange earnings for some countries in 
Africa and they are prohibited under the protection of 
Animal Rights Act of the United States.  
The MFN rule provides a prevalent ground for 
the meeting of both developed and developing countries 
in terms of Agricultural and industrial economies; the 
equalitarian functions of this standard correspond to one 
of the permanent interest of sovereign states. This study 
described it as goose pimples outside the pristine context 
of the authentic purport of international economic 
cognations. Schwarzenberger106  argues that since the 
criterion of the equal treatment is of a foreign state, it is 
compatible with discrimination between foreigners and 
nationals and this breeds protectionist and nationalist 
periods, not exposed to the remonstration which may 
militate against the standard of national treatment.107  
One  good example of trade deficit of LDCs of 
Africa  is the arrangement of textile and clothing (T&C) 
industry of LDCs. Fortunately, T&C products are 
"typically among the first items produced and exported 
by newly industrializing economy as it began to diversify 
away from primary production.108 Exporting countries are 
affected by a reduction in export opportunity bridged by 
advanced countries. Although this is partly offset by the 
"quota rent," studies have shown that the export The 
MFA109  provides that importing countries can take 
unilateral or bilaterally agreed restrictive measures to 
avoid "disruptive effects in individual markets and on 
individual lines of production."110 During MFA, many 
unilateral measures were taken after unsuccessful 
consultations; recently almost all restrictions have been 
made under bilateral agreements between the importing 
and exporting countries. Although consumers in 
importing countries incur huge cost from MFA quotas, 
the number of domestic jobs saved or created by the 
quotas is relatively small. MFA quotas are therefore, a 
                                                           
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid.  
108J. Goto, „The Multi-fibre Arrangement and Its Effects on Developing 
Countries‟ (1989),  The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
pp. 203-227.  Oxford University Press.  
109 See MFA, Articles 3 and 4. 
110 Article 3of the MFN rules provide for measures taken when market 
disruption occurs, and article 4 provides for measures when there is only 
the risk of disruption. 
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poor way to protect workers from foreign competition.111   
During MFA, many unilateral measures were taken after 
unsuccessful consultations; recently virtually all 
restrictions have been made under bilateral agreements 
between the importing and exporting countries. 
Consumers in importing countries incur astronomically 
immense cost from MFA quotas; the number of domestic 
jobs preserved by the quotas is relatively minute. MFA 
quotas are therefore, a poor way to protect workers from 
foreign competition. 
IV.   ARTICLE III (2) (4) OF GATT IS A 
PARALYSIS OF MANY 
INTERPRETATIONS.  
 
Mirroring the provisions of Article III (2) (4) of 
GATT, it would appear that there is a policy intendment 
therein rather than  application of  law. While paragraphs 
2 and 4 of Article III is fairly uncomplicated, the 
commencement point is pristinely policy-predicated as 
contained in Paragraph 1 of Article III: The provision is 
to the effect that governments should not employ 
“internal” measures such as internal taxes or internal 
regulations -- to give protection to domestic industry. It is 
simply a rule which clearly states that internal measures 
must not give less favorable treatment to “like” foreign 
products.  This anti-protection goal would only be 
achieved if “like foreign products” is defined to mean 
competitive foreign products advantage. This is presently 
not the case.   
Querying this provision further is on whether the 
application of these rules is authentically applying to both 
developed and developing countries in view of the 
impasse of the Uruguay Rounds of tariffs discussion 
which end in a partial deadlocked? The argument that less 
favourable treatment will tends to protect domestic 
products; especially, where it imposes a commercial 
disadvantage (obligations) on those foreign products with 
which the domestic product compete for sales is quite 
unclear. The stake is that “Competitiveness” in this sense 
is best quantified by the substitutability of the foreign 
products – the extent to which consumers are disposed to 
choose the foreign product in supersession for the 
domestic product.112 
Furthering this discussion, one optically discerns 
that the provision is just on paper as its inhibitions 
outweigh the usefulness to the promotion of developing 
trade. There is no clarity in the provision of Article III 
paragraphs 2 and 4.  There is no clear-cut wherein to 
draw the line between “like and competitive.” As 
suggested by Hudec,  foreign products are numerous 
which would fall at least some negative competitive 
impact from being taxed or regulated more heavily than a 
particular domestic product; could be fairly wide.113      
                                                           
111 Supra note 64 at page 24. 
112 Ibid. In order to make the provision clearer, there would be need to 
avoid undue interference with the tax and regulatory policy of the 
importing country. It is therefore necessary that there is need to 
draw a line of demarcation separating those foreign products that 
suffers or a likely to suffer a major competitive disadvantage from 
those upon whom the negative effect will be milder. This was 
omitted in the provision of the GATT rules.  
113 Ibid. 
  The difficulty in explicating Article III (2) of 
GATT is that its paragraph 4 is the only pivotal rule of 
Article III. It deals with internal non-tax regulations and it 
is not constructed in the same way as paragraph 2. 
Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the provision does not 
contain a second stanza proscribing deferential treatment 
of not-like-but directly-competitive products. Thus, there 
seems to be conflicts between paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
Article III of GATT. The internal regulation rule is 
nothing short of verbally expressing that less favourble 
treatment must not be given to “like” foreign products – if 
the foreign product concern is not “like” the germane 
domestic product, the government may treat it less 
propitiously; even if such differential regulation has a 
protective outcome.  
Hudec suggested two ways of resolving the 
conflict.   The impression given from the wordings of 
Article 1 (1) appears to apply the same MFN principle to 
each of the above discussed subject areas; that is, when it 
is defined in terms of what appears to be identically 
equivalent principle to each of the different subject areas 
of “like product” concept.114 The fact that the provision 
covers so many different measures customarily ought to 
raise the possibility that the content of the MFN rule may 
not be identically equal for each area. Analytically, the 
different policies applicable to different subject areas will 
quite often call for different type of MFN rule, expressed 
by a different definition of “like product” for at least 
some of the different subject areas. 
With regard to the non-discrimination policy of 
MFN rule of GATT in Article 1 (1), it is predicated on 
economic perspective. This should be quite similar to the 
protection policy in view of the National Treatment rule 
of Article III.  It is argued that in terms of its legal effects, 
“discrimination” (less auspicious treatment of goods from 
one foreign country vis- a -vis the goods of another 
foreign country” is no different than breach of the 
National Treatment obligation (less auspicious treatment 
of foreign goods vis-a-vis domestic goods). It is notable 
that the legal effect of discrimination is to “protect” the 
goods of the advantaged country from competition with 
the goods of the disadvantaged country; it is equally just 
as denial of national treatment to protects local goods 
against all foreign goods. The protection equally distorts 
the allocation of resources, and thus, the promotion of 
wealth creation through trade. 115 The rule of MFN has 
not promoted Nigeria or any other Sub-Saharan trade 
since its creation. There is no empirical proof. 
The study finds that under the International Economic 
Order, the Geneva agreement operates within the wider 
international framework of the Amalgamated Nations. 
The exhibition of standard is minimal in scope by the 
overriding requisites of the international economic law. In 
accordance with the provision of Article I of the 
Agreement, the most-favored-nation standard in its 
                                                           
114  Decision by the Arbitrators (U.S. complaint) [WT/DS26/ARB, 12 
July 1999] 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/26arb.pdf,  Accessed on 
the 18th day of October, 2016 and Decision by the Arbitrators (Canada 
complaint) [WT/DS48/ARB, 12 July 1999, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/48arb.pdf. Accessed on 
October 27, 2016.  
115 Ibid. 
African Trade Growth or Trade Deficit: GATT/WTO Rules as Trojan Horse on African Trade Development 
 
                                                                           87                                                                            www.wjrr.org 
unconditional form applies to customs obligations and  
charges imposed in connection with importation or 
exportation of goods or on the international transfer of 
payment for imports or export and to methods and 
formalities in connection with importation and 
exportation.116  
As noted by Schwarzenberger,117 the more 
preponderant the number of parties to a multilateral 
agreement adopting the most-favored-nation standard, the 
more frivolous the standard becomes. In essence, it 
signifies that in absence of treaties with the non-party 
states, the MFN standard may remain inoperative in the 
Geneva Agreement.  
Africa is the worst hit of the GATT arrangement because 
in most of the rounds, negotiations are done by the 
industrialized nations with little contribution from the 
least developing countries.   Some of the rules regulating 
GATT support the reasons why Lester Thurow's 
declaration that “GATT is dead” is has gathered dust by 
crystallizing the dissenting positions in the trade and 
industrial policy debate.118   VI. 
FINDINGS/CONCLUSION. 
This study finds that the most dangerous and misleading 
notion about the GATT trade principles is the inequitable 
trade fallacy. Countries that have relatively open trading 
systems are being inequitably exploited by countries that 
are relatively restrictive. This leads to demands for 
increment of domestic replication to foreign protection, a 
perverse form of reciprocity.119 The reservations 
expressed by most African countries as to fairness of the 
conduct of free trade by developed countries are not 
farfetched. The difficulties experienced by most of the 
developing countries from Africa are because WTO 
agreements are concerned with only goods, services and 
intellectual property.120 There have been so many 
bottlenecks in implementing free trade in consonance 
with the provisions of the GATT Charter. The developed 
countries merely paid lips service not accompanied with 
serious action. These rules are pristinely politically 
motivated by the industrialized nations to keep African 
trade more impotent perpetually subjugated to the 
economies of the advance countries. There existed so 
many bottlenecks in implementing free trade in 
consonance with the provisions of the GATT Charter. 
The developed countries merely paid lip service as these 
rules are purely politically motivated by the powerful 
industrialized nations to keep the weaker nations 
perpetually subjugated.  
The study further discovers that it is important 
for the developing countries to integrate with the world 
economy, but they need to function more in region trade. 
                                                           
116 Article if „GATT. In other words, the most-favored-nation standard is 
used in connection with matter of internal taxation and regulation I 
and III while freedom of transit is Article V(5). 
117 Supra note 132 at page 53. 
118 B. Bethune. “Is There a Future for the GATT in the New world 
Economic Order.” (1992) Business Economics, Vol. 27, No.4, pp. 51 -
56. Palgrave Macmillan Journal. 
119 Ibid.  
120 J. K. Patnaik and J. K. Patnaik “The Doha Round of World Trade 
Negotiations: A Preview and Perspective, a developing country 
analysis” 2007), The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 68, No. 3. 
pp.547-560. Indian Political Science Association, Available at 
www.jstor.org/stable/41856354, Accessed on the 23rd day of May, 2016. 
The barriers to trade ought to have been eliminated in all 
strata through trade negations but this can never be a 
reality as long as the developed nations are unwilling to 
amend some of the rules of GATT. It is practically 
impossible pushing for the amendment of MFN rule and 
other rules of GATT. Africa needs to create its own 
regional trade arrangement to rival WTO as way forward 
to their economic growth. This would ascertain the giving 
of fair competitive opportunity to the African trade area 
of MFA, Agricultural tariffs, and Textile and clothing 
(T&C) growth consideration. The study recommends that 
the only way out for Africa is to fall back to regional 
trade for certainty of trade acceleration and ceding 
concessions in block arrangement. This will ascertain a 
boundary to the perpetual subjugation by the non-ground- 
shifting position of the developed nations under the 
present rules of GATT; which were made ages before 
most African countries had their independence. It is 
unacceptable that the interest of African countries were 
annexed to their colonial masters when in fact they stand 
as sovereign nations.  
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